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 1 
Hiding in Plain Sight?  
Japan’s Militarization of Space and Challenges to the Yoshida 
Doctrine  
 
Japan’s security trajectory and potential for attaining greater assertiveness, “normal” 
status, and remilitarization of defense policy, remain subject to intense debate.1 Prime 
Minister Abe Shinzō’s security policy, involving a new preparedness to face down 
China and taboo-busting reforms, such as in September 2015 passing extensive 
legislation to overturn the sixty-year-old ban on the exercise of the right of collective 
self-defense (CSD), have refocused domestic and international attention on this debate.2 
Such developments raise the question of whether fundamental change is finally manifest 
in Japanese security strategy. This paper argues that, through its militarization of outer 
                                                        
1 Remilitarization in this paper is defined as increasing acceptance by Japan’s policy-makers and its 
citizenry of the efficacy and centrality of military power for national security ends. Japan has thus moved 
from an early post-war demilitarized state, to now adopt an expanded military role in terms of function, 
geographical scope, and external partnerships, and a new preparedness to exercise armed force for 
security purposes not only individually but through (CSD). The militarization of space involves a similar 
process of eroding past constraints on this dimension of military power; the overt appropriation of space 
as a military domain and the procurement of military space capabilities by the Japan Ministry of Defense 
and (JSDF); the extension of military cooperation in space to encompass the external partnership of the 
U.S.-Japan alliance; and a set of domestic policy institutions and norms embedded within policy elites 
and the general public increasingly conducive to military space activities. The militarization of space does 
not as yet equate to the weaponization of space capabilities but rather their use to support military 
activities in the land, sea and air domains. Further elaboration of the benchmarking for judging the 
militarization of space is offered in subsequent sections of the paper.  
2 The Abe administration’s reforms consist of Japan’s first National Security Strategy (NSS) and National 
Security Council (NSC) in December 2013; revisions of the National Defense Program Guidelines 
(NDPG) and Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) in the same month; a State Secrecy Law, again in the 
same month; adoption of the Three Principles of Defense Equipment Transfers in April 2014; and a 
revised Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter in February 2015 allowing for the transfer of 
aid to foreign militaries if for humanitarian and disaster relief purposes. In U.S.-Japan relations, the Abe 
administration in April 2015 effected the first revision of the Defense Guidelines since 1997, and most 
significantly passed a raft of security bills in the National Diet in September 2015: The Law on Response 
to Contingencies, enabling Japan’s exercise of the right of CSD in scenarios where an attack on another 
state in a close relationship with Japan poses a clear danger to overturning the Japanese people’s right to 
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, where there is no other appropriate means to repel the attack, 
and where the use of force is restricted to the minimum necessary to repel the attack; Law to Ensure 
Security in Contingencies Significantly Affecting Japan, replacing the 1999 Regional Contingencies Law 
and designed to boost Japanese non-combat logistical support for the U.S. and now other states regionally 
and even globally; International Peace Support Law, removing the need for Japan to enact separate laws 
for each JSDF dispatch to provide logistical support to multinational forces; and revisions to the 
International Peace Cooperation Law, enabling the JSDF during UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) to 
use force in pursuing certain duties rather than just defending JSDF personnel. 
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space activities, as a driver of broader military-strategic change, Japan is starting to 
fundamentally deviate from its post-war grand strategy of the “Yoshida Doctrine.” 
 
In the midst of a changing regional balance of power, with China’s rise and Japan’s 
search for a more proactive foreign and security policy, mainstream academic policy 
discourse in Japan and the U.S. has tended to stress fundamental continuity. Abe’s and 
other administrations’ security reforms are cast as moderate, positive for the alliance 
and international community, fully in line with previous national and bilateral strategic 
postures, and tempered by domestic political and international constraints. 3 Japan is 
presented as continuing to follow a pragmatic line in the face of domestic and 
international constraints, a focus on proactive diplomacy and economic engagement, 
and continued incremental and minimalist contributions to the bilateral alliance.4 In 
short, Japan is seen to eventually rebound to the essential tenets of the Yoshida line, and 
even any “post-Yoshida consensus” is likely to be a modification of rather than 
fundamental breakout from the existing grand strategy. 
 
                                                        
3 For views arguing for essential status quo and moderation in Japan’s grand strategy, see Hosoya Yuichi, 
“Bringing ‘Internationalism’ Back,” 23 June 2014, http://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00122/; and 
Kitaoka Shinichi, “The Turnabout of Japan’s Security Policy: Toward ‘Proactive Pacifism,’” 2 April 
2014, http://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00108/; Gerald L. Curtis, “Japan’s Cautious Hawks: Why 
Tokyo is Unlikely to Pursue an Aggressive Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 92, No. 2 (2013), pp. 
78-86; Brad Glosserman, “Abe’s Dilemmas,” PacNet, No. 37, May 30, 2014, 
http://csis.org/publication/pacnet-37-abes-dilemmas; Michael Green, and Jeffrey Hornung, “Ten Myths 
About Japan’s Collective Self-Defense Change: What the Critics Don’t Understand About Japan’s 
Constitutional Reinterpretation,” The Diplomat, July 10, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/ten-
myths-about-japans-collective-self-defense-change/.   
4 Jeremy Moses and Tadashi Iwami, “From Pacifism to Militarisation: Liberal-Democratic Discourse and 
Japan’s Global Role,” Global Change, Peace and Security Vol. 21, No. 1 (2009), pp. 69-84;; Adam P. 
Liff, “Japan’s Defense Policy: Abe the Evolutionary,” The Washington Quarterly Vol. 38, No. 2 (2015), 
pp. 79-99; Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, “Japan’s Dual Hedge,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 81, 
No. 5 (2002), pp. 110-121; and Richard J. Samuels, “Japan’s Goldilocks Strategy,” The Washington 
Quarterly Vol. 29, No. 4 (2006), pp. 111-127;  John Nilsson-Wright and Kiichi Fujiwara, Japan’s Abe 
Administration: Steering a Course Between Pragmatism and Extremism, Research Paper, Chatham House 
Asia Programme, September 2015, 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150914JapanAbeAdmi
nistrationNilssonWrightFujiwara.pdf. 
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This paper challenges the “Abe as aberration” view, arguing that Japan’s militarization 
of space represents the vanguard of a longer-term maneuvering, started by Abe’s 
predecessors and accelerating under his administration, toward a policy of increasingly 
open deterrence and containment of North Korea and China, and a commitment to game-
changing U.S.-Japan military cooperation and strategy that move far beyond the 
traditional “Yoshida script”.5 Further, it is vital to correctly understand Japan’s new 
security direction because it impacts so greatly on the stability of the Asia-Pacific 
region. Japan’s choices matter: to the U.S.’s need for a more capable and forthcoming 
Japanese ally in effecting its “rebalance” strategy, and even more for East Asian 
neighbors that perceive Japan as a potential partner or adversary.6  
 
To make these arguments, the paper proceeds in six sections. The first creates a 
framework of baselines for assessing potential continuity or change in Japan’s grand 
strategy by identifying the core tenets of the Yoshida Doctrine—comprising the 
strategic outlook of policy-makers making for a minimalist orientation of national 
security policy and alliance commitments, constraints on military capabilities, and 
formal and informal domestic security institutions and prohibitions and norms limiting 
the usage of military power—that need to be overridden for any major shift in security 
trajectory. The second explains the central importance of the militarization of space for 
driving and illustrating broader changes across all dimensions of Japanese security 
policy and military power in the same way as it permeates the efforts of other advanced 
states involved in network-centric warfare and Defense Transformation and 
                                                        
5 Samuels, “Japan’s Goldilocks Strategy,” p. 118.  
6 Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, visited Tokyo in February 2017 to offer assurances that the 
fundamental framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance remained unchanged despite statements by President 
Donald J. Trump during the 2016 presidential campaign suggesting a pull back from U.S. security 
commitments. Michael R. Gordon and Mokoto Rich, “Jim Mattis Says U.S. Is ‘Shoulder to Shoulder’ 
With Japan,” New York Times, February 3, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/world/asia/us-
japan-mattis-abe-defense.html?_r=0. 
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demonstrates the ways in which space programs contain the potential to challenge each 
of the Yoshida Doctrine’s core tenets. 7 The third section investigates the extent that 
Japan’s space programs have actually begun to challenge these key tenets, in regard to 
the transformation of Japan’s strategic orientation and desire to boost national efforts to 
balance security threats internally through its own national capabilities and externally 
via the U.S.-Japan alliance, and through both balancing mechanisms significantly 
enhancing deterrence mainly by ‘denial’ but now increasingly also by ‘punishment’. 
The fourth demonstrates the ways in which Japan’s space programs have begun to bring 
about a qualitative step change away from past constraints through the procurement by 
all services of the JSDF of increasingly powerful military space technologies and of 
other military capabilities and doctrines in the maritime, air and land domains 
fundamentally reliant on space for their effective operation. It further explores how 
Japan has begun to place its space capabilities at the disposal of the U.S.-Japan alliance, 
with a new preparedness for the integration of bilateral strategic deterrence, and 
crucially precipitating the revision of constitutional interpretations on the exercise of 
CSD that impact on all dimensions of Japanese security. The fifth examines the role of 
space programs in leading the way for a significant strengthening of domestic policy-
making institutions and public opinion to facilitate Japan’s more robust military profile, 
including the breaching of a key anti-militaristic prohibition on the peaceful use of 
space. These sections drawing on new empirical information—including internal party 
political, government, and industrial documents and interviews with key policy-
                                                        
7 A military that can effectively occupy the “strategic high ground” of space has a tremendous advantage 
in terms of command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C3ISR), 
maneuverability, and firepower. For the centrality of space to modern military doctrine, see Jan Vol Tol, 
Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich and Jim Thomas, Air Sea Battle: A Point-Of-Departure 
Operational Concept, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010, 
http://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/2010.05.18-AirSea-Battle.pdf. 
 
 
 5 
makers—demonstrate the significant upscaling of military space programs and Japan’s 
resolve to pursue a more radical security policy. Overall, the conclusion argues that 
Japan’s militarization of space has been accompanied by the jettisoning of the central 
tenets of the Yoshida Doctrine and that the ongoing transformation of its security 
trajectory is now revealed as “hiding in plain sight”.  
 
Gauging the durability of the Yoshida Doctrine 
To gauge the role and impact of the militarization of space as a case study for 
understanding Japan’s security trajectory, this paper offers a framework for assessing 
and making plain the extent of shifts in overall security strategy as judged against the 
benchmarks of continuity or change in the core tenets of the Yoshida Doctrine. If the 
militarization of space can be demonstrated to be effecting transformation in these core 
tenets, then, given the increasing influence of space across all dimensions of military 
planning and capabilities, and the centrality of the doctrine itself to Japan’s security 
trajectory to date, this challenges not only assumptions of essential continuity in 
Japanese security policy but also indicates the potential for step change in grand 
strategy. 
 
It is important to note that the Yoshida Doctrine as a grand strategy is not static and has 
evolved in the post-war period, moving from an original foreign policy line (Yoshida 
rosen) under Prime Minister Yoshida in the early 1950s, to a more systemized doctrine 
(Yoshida dokutorin) as Japan has incrementally expanded its national capabilities to 
engage in security responsibilities alongside the U.S. and its partners. 8  Phased 
incremental changes have included the JSDF assuming responsibility for sea lines of 
                                                        
8 Soeya Yoshihide, “Yoshida Rosen to Yoshida Dokutorin—Jo ni Kaete,” Kokusai Seiji No. 151 (2008), 
pp. 6-10. 
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communication in the late 1970s and 1980s in line with the 1978 U.S.-Japan Defense 
Guidelines, and the build-up under the Nakasone Yasuhiro administration of anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) and air interceptor capabilities to provide a defensive shield 
to complement the spear of U.S. power projection; to the provision of rear area logistical 
support for regional contingencies in the late 1990s under the revised 1997 Defense 
Guidelines; and then to non-combat support for U.S. coalition operations in the Indian 
Ocean between 2001 and 2010 under the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, 
and between 2004 and 2008 under the 2003 Iraq Reconstruction Law.  
 
Nonetheless, the consensus is that the Yoshida Doctrine still provides the central 
framework for assessing shifts in Japanese security policy. This is due to the fact that 
all the main policy and academic analyses, of all ideological and paradigmatic stripes, 
concur that its core tenets, even if continually tested and stretched, have remained 
essentially intact into the contemporary period.     
 
In establishing the core tenets of the Yoshida Doctrine and identifying the baselines for 
any potential shifts or continuity in Japanese security, most analysts judge the degree of 
its durability in terms of Japanese policy-makers’ outlook on the international security 
environment and whether they still calculate an overall equilibrium in the regional 
balance of power, retain confidence in U.S. security guarantees, remain conscious of the 
risks of abandonment, but most especially entrapment in US military strategy, and thus 
maintain minimalist commitments to bilateral security cooperation.9 
 
                                                        
9 Samuels, Securing Japan, pp. 40-41; Tsuchiyama Jitsuo, “Nichibei Dōmei no Kokusai Seiji Riron,” 
Kokusai Seiji No. 115 (1997), pp. 169-170; Victor D. Cha, “Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical 
Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and Korea,” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 44, No. 2 
(2000), pp. 271-281. 
 7 
Japan’s maintenance of the core tenets is further demonstrated through: retaining a 
traditional low military posture and limitations on the build-up and exercise of national 
military power, including the maintenance of an “exclusively defense-oriented defense 
policy”; a preference for highly limited deterrence by denial and eschewing the 
acquisition by the JSDF of power projection or even offensive capabilities for deterrence 
by punishment; strict observance of a non-nuclear posture, and containing defense 
budgets within the framework of one percent of Gross National Product (GNP).10 In 
addition, Japanese adherence to the Yoshida Doctrine is manifested in reluctance to 
engage in external balancing alongside the U.S. against potential adversaries, and 
concomitantly continued hedging behavior on military commitments under the alliance; 
attempts to circumscribe defensive responsibilities to Japan itself; non-integration of 
Japanese and U.S. military capabilities and technologies, and, most crucially, the non-
exercise of the right of CSD.11 
 
Furthermore, adherence to the Yoshida Doctrine is also typically characterized at the 
domestic level by embedded informal and formal institutions constraining military 
commitments, for example: the one percent of GNP defense expenditure; the 1967 and 
1976 restrictions on the exports of arms and technology; the Three Non-Nuclear 
Principles of 1967; civilian control of the military establishment; the 1969 Peaceful 
Purposes Resolution (PPR) on the use of outer space; the contestation amongst formal 
institutions and pluralistic actors militating against overall political and strategic control 
                                                        
10 Kōsaka Masataka, Saishō Yoshida Shigeru (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha, 1968), pp. 47-59; Kenneth 
B. Pyle, “In Pursuit of a Grand Design: Nakasone Betwixt the Past and Future’”, The Journal of Japanese 
Studies Vol. 13, No. 2 (1987), pp. 246-249; Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, pp. 14-15; Samuels, 
Securing Japan, pp. 35, 43. 
11 Sakamoto Kazuya, Nichibei Dōmei no Kizuna: Anpo Jōyaku to Sōgo no Mosaku (Tokyo: Yūhikakusha, 
2000), pp. 39-60; Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising, pp. 253-256; Kenneth B. Pyle, “The Sea Change in 
Japanese Foreign Policy,” NBR Analysis Brie, June 17, 2014, 
http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/pdf/Brief/061714_Pyle_JapanSeaChange.pdf, p. 1; Samuels, 
“Japan’s Goldilocks Strategy,” pp. 118, 121-123. 
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over security policy; and the persistence of anti-militaristic principles and norms.12 All 
these core tenets are summarized in Table 1, and thus provide a framework against 
which the impact of the militarization of space can be calibrated in challenging the 
Yoshida Doctrine. 
  
The militarization of space as central for gauging changes in Japanese security 
Japan’s space programs are in some ways the “hard test” and yet ideal case for assessing 
shifts in the framework outlined above of Japanese security policy. Japan’s space 
programs are “hard” in the sense that for over forty years since 1969 and the National 
Diet PPR, space policy has been paraded as a paragon of self-imposed restraints on 
remilitarization. Analysts have interpreted Japanese space policy as either lacking a 
national security angle, or as reinforcing just how minimally its security strategy has 
changed. Japan, the consensus asserts, stands as a non-security-related and normative 
exception to regional and global trends for the militarization of space in seeking space 
technology for its own sake and civilian “soft power” ends.13 
                                                        
12 Kent E. Calder, Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 414-439; Sun-Ki Chai, “Entrenching the Yoshida Doctrine: 
Three Techniques for Institutionalization,” International Organization Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), 
pp. 389-412; Thomas U. Berger, “Alliance Politics and Japan’s Postwar Culture of Anti-Militarism,” in 
Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future (New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), pp. 192-199; Andrew L. Oros and Yuki Tatsumi, Global 
Security Watch: Japan (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), pp. 27-46; Samuels, Securing Japan, pp. 49-
56. Yoshihide Soeya, “Japan: Normative Constraints Versus Structural Imperatives,” in Mutiah 
Alagappa, ed. Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1998), pp. 228-229. 
13  See, for example, Oros, Normalizing Japan, pp. 122-148; Andrew L. Oros, “Explaining Japan’s 
Tortured Course to Surveillance Satellites,” Review of Policy Research Vol. 24, No.1 (2007), pp. 29-48, 
35, 40; Columba Peoples, “A Normal Space Power? Understanding ‘Security’ in Japan’s Space Policy 
Discourse,” Space Policy. Vol. 29, No. 2 (2013), pp. 135-143; Joan Johnson-Freese and Lance Gatling, 
“Security Implications of Japan’s Information Gathering Satellite (IGS) System,” Intelligence and 
National Security Vol. 19, No. 3 (2004), pp. 538-552; Kazuto Suzuki, “Space: Japan’s New Security 
Agenda,” RIPS Policy Perspectives No.5 (October 2007); Setsuko Aoki, “Current Status and Recent 
Developments in Japan’s National Space Law and its Relevance to Pacific Rim Space Law and 
Activities,” Journal of Space Law Vol. 35, No. 1 (2009), pp. 363-438; James Clay Moltz, Asia’s Space 
Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries and International Risks (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2012), pp. 43, 63; Suzuki Kazuto, Uchū Kaihatsu to Kokusai Seiji (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2013), 
pp. 179, 182-183. For views of Japanese military intent, see Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s 
Remilitarization (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 48-50; Saadia M. Pekkanen and Paul Kallender-Umezu, 
In Defense of Japan: From the Market to the Military in Space Policy (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 2010); Paul Kallender-Umezu “Enacting Japan’s Basic Law for Space Activities: 
Revolution or Evolution?” Space Policy Vol. 29, No. 1 (February 2013), pp. 28-34; Christopher W. 
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However, this paper posits that Japan’s space programs are in fact pivotal for assessing 
the framework of the durability of the Yoshida Doctrine and potential changes in Japan’s 
security trajectory. First, Japan’s space programs pose fundamental questions relating 
to the continuity of security policy given that over the last two decades, but especially 
over the last eight years culminating in the publication of the most recent space strategy, 
there has been a move toward increasingly overt militarization and challenge to their 
previously perceived position as reinforcing the security status quo.14 
 
Second, examination of Japan’s militarization of space is particularly analytically 
powerful because this dimension of the security of the “global commons” and the 
development of related space-based capabilities are increasingly the driving forces 
behind many states’ broader military modernization of naval, air and land forces to 
leverage advanced Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)/Defense Transformation-type 
technologies for qualitative advantage even within a constrained quantitative resource 
base.15 Hence, Japan’s ability to breakout from its previous security stance should be 
judged not merely in terms of the classic “comprehensive national power” indicators of 
the sheer size and numbers of military expenditure, armed forces, and key weapons 
platforms.16 For while the Abe administration is indeed bolstering these traditional 
                                                        
Hughes, “Japan, Ballistic Missile Defence and Remilitarisation,” Space Policy Vol. 29, No. 2 (May 2013), 
pp. 128-134; Satoru Ikeuchi, Uchū Kaihatsu wa Heiwa no Tame: Uchū no Gunjika ni Noridashita Nihon 
(Tokyo: Kamogawa Shuppan, 2015), pp. 79-134; Hoshiyama Takashi, Nihon Gaikō Kara Mita Uchū 
(Tokyo: Sakuhinsha, 2016), pp. 1-18, 139-162.  
14 Uchū Kaihatsu Senryaku Honbu, Uchū Kihon Keikaku, January 9, 2015, 
http://www8.cao.go.jp/space/plan/plan2/plan2.pdf.; Uchū Kaihatsu Senryaku Honbu, Uchū Kihon 
Keikaku,  April 1, 2016 http://www8.cao.go.jp/space/plan/plan3/plan3.pdf. 
15  Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of US Hegemony,” 
International Security Vol. 28, No. 1 (2003), pp. 12-14. 
16 Robert Dujarric, “Shinzō Abe: Investing in the Past, Ignoring the Future”, The Diplomat, 25 July 2014, 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/shinzo-abe-investing-in-the-past-ignoring-the-future/. For trends in 
Japan’s defense expenditure and procurement, see Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Foreign and Security 
Policy Under the ‘Abe Doctrine’: New Dynamism or Dead End? (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 
pp. 36-37. JMOD for fiscal 2015-2016 requested a 2.2 percent increase in defense budget, returning to 
the levels of the late 1990s and marking the largest post-war defense budget. Bōeishō, “Waga Kuni no 
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systems in the most recent revised 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), 
as the document which lays out national defense doctrine alongside the necessary force 
posture, exclusive focus on this fails to fully consider how Japan may radically shift its 
security stance and leverage these systems by building a qualitative edge through space 
technologies.17 Moreover, this technology-strategic approach, involving space and its 
latent qualitative importance as a force multiplier, is especially pertinent in Japan’s case, 
given its well-known historical maxim of “rich nation, strong army,” and recognition 
that military capabilities may be vested in highly transferable and potent dual-use 
civilian and “paramilitary” technologies and forces.18 
 
To demonstrate this transformational potential of Japan’s space programs and their 
impact ranged against the core tenets of the Yoshida Doctrine, it is important to establish 
baselines for measuring the significance of change in the programs themselves. 
Specifically, Japan, in terms of challenging the core tenet of Yoshida Doctrine revolving 
around strategic confidence in the international environment status quo and consequent 
                                                        
Bōei to Yosan: Heisei 28nendo Gaisan Yōkyū no Gaiyō”, August 2015, 
http://www.mod.go.jp/j/yosan/2016/gaisan.pdf. 
17 The NDPG will increase the MSDF’s destroyer fleet from forty-eight to fifty-four, including the 
addition of two further Aegis BMD-equipped destroyers to the existing four Kongō-class and two Atago-
class vessels. The MSDF will continue to procure four new 25DD Akizuki-class multi-mission destroyers, 
and two 27,000 ton 22/24DDH Izumo-class helicopter carriers embarking up to 14 helicopters, providing 
a very strong ASW capability and versatile naval assets. MSDF submarine capabilities increase 
significantly, with the revised NDPG and MTDP continuing the 2010 NDPG’s build-up of the MSDF 
fleet from sixteen to twenty-two boats, and the introduction of the Sōryū-class submarine platform 
providing leading-edge air-independent and fuel-cell propulsion. The MSDF’s air fleet is strengthened 
through the procurement of the P-1 with an 8,000-kilometer range capable of patrolling and ASW 
operations deep into the South China Sea. The revised NDPG and MTDP maintain the ASDF’s 
acquisition of forty-two F-35A fifth-generation fighters. The ASDF continues to procure the 6,500-
kilometer range C-2 transport; BMD Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3; and is set to procure 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to patrol Japan’s extensive coastline and remote islands. The GSDF will 
create a 3,000 personnel unit akin to a marine corps for the retaking of remote islands, equipped with 52 
amphibious armored personnel carriers and 17 MV-22 Osprey aircraft. Japan Ministry of Defense, 
National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and Beyond, December 17, 2013, 
http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217_e2.pdf, 7. 
18 For the classic formulations of Japanese dual-use civilian-military technology, see Richard J. Samuels, 
Rich Nation, Strong Army: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan (Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press, 1994); and Michael E. Chinworth, Inside Japan’s Defense: 
Technology, Economics and Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s US, 1992). On Japan’s use of 
“paramilitary” units to disguise Japan’s armed force, see Richard J. Samuels, ‘“New Fighting Power!”: 
Japan’s Growing Maritime Capabilities and East Asian Security,” International Security Vol. 32, No. 3 
(2007/2008), pp. 84-112.  
 11 
determination to maintain minimalist national and alliance commitments, should be 
expected to take a more radical line, and embed outer space in national security strategy 
and doctrines for internal balancing and within alliance relations for external balancing, 
and extending even to breaching the ban on CSD.  
 
In turn, to function as a significant military player in space and other military 
dimensions, and thus to challenge the Yoshida Doctrine’s focus on constraining the 
build-up and usage of military capabilities, Japan should be prepared to develop space 
capabilities that supersede previous limitations in projecting power and supporting 
alliance activities to enable greatly enhanced deterrence by denial and increasingly 
punishment. Japan’s seriousness of intent in developing such capabilities is likely to be 
seen in the Japan Ministry of Defense (JMOD) and JSDF attempting to match the triad 
of space systems deployed by the existing major space powers of the U.S and China that 
serve respectively as Japan’s ally and principal regional protagonist, and as outlined in 
Table 2.  
 
The first component of such a triad is the development of independent space launch 
access, including liquid and solid-fueled rockets and missiles, and re-entry vehicles. The 
second involves communication and intelligence satellites, consisting of constellations 
of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), navigation and military-use 
global positioning systems (GPS), Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) for tracking 
activities at sea, Space Situational Awareness (SSA) for tracking hazardous and hostile 
objects in space, space-based early-warning (EW), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and 
electronic intelligence (ELINT). The third is the development of defensive and 
(potentially) offensive counterspace capabilities for deterrence by denial and 
 12 
punishment, including ballistic missile defenses (BMD), global strike for delivering 
precision-guided munitions from space, and anti-satellite (ASAT) systems through 
direct-ascent striking of satellites with missiles or co-orbital placing of objects in the 
path of satellites. Japan’s moves to deploy this space triad should provide the JSDF with 
a force multiplier to enable its full participation in network-centric warfare, joint 
operations, and combined Air-Sea Battle missions alongside the U.S., and to counter 
China’s rising military power.   
 
In addition to this triad of capabilities, Japan’s intent to overcome the core tenets of 
Yoshida Doctrine through the advancement of space programs can be gauged by its 
creation of institutions to centralize and enhance collaboration among the key political, 
bureaucratic and industrial actors involved in shaping security strategy. If Japan can be 
observed to overcome previous obstacles domestically to the militarization of space, 
then this points the way to the potential for significant departures from the Yoshida 
Doctrine more broadly across all dimensions of security.19  
  
 
Japan’s new realism in space policy: challenging the Yoshida Doctrine status quo 
 
Non-militarized space policy from the Cold War to mid-1990s 
During the Cold War, Japanese policy-makers, in line with the Yoshida Doctrine, 
perceived no existential threat sufficient to pursue internal or external balancing and 
remained largely confident in the U.S.’s superiority and ability to moderate security 
                                                        
19 Department of Defense, National Security Space Strategy: Unclassified Summary, Washington D.C., 
Department of Defense, 2010, 
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111_nsss/docs/NationalSecuritySpaceStrategyUnclassifie
dSummary_Jan2011.pdfJanuary 2011, p. 9. 
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dilemmas in the conventional, nuclear and space domains.20 But Japan did prize space 
technologies for the inherent dual-use civilian and military applications, and made rapid 
progress in key space platforms, especially launch vehicles. The National Aerospace 
Laboratory (NAL), Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS), and National 
Space Development Agency (NASDA) (merged since 2003 into the current Japan 
Aerospace Exploration Agency [JAXA]) developed by the 1990s the solid-propellant 
M-3SII, M-V and J-I, routinely appraised as ICBM-convertible.21 Japan also developed 
the Advanced Land Observing Satellite (ALOS) with potential utility for military 
reconnaissance.22  
 
The Nakasone administration decided in 1985 to allow the JSDF to use satellites for 
military communications and imagery, based on the interpretation that, since satellite 
information was already so commercially prevalent, the distinction between civilian and 
military usage was redundant.23 Japan’s main military contractors also expressed strong 
interest as early as 1986 in the proposed U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), with 
significant Japanese participation in the 1989-1993 Western Pacific (WESTPAC) 
Missile Defense Architecture Study, laying the technological groundwork for Japanese 
participation in BMD a decade later.24 Japan, though, still lacked sufficient international 
security concerns to switch its space strategy to a military track. National space strategy 
was expressed in a series of idealistic “Fundamental Plans” that sought to position space 
technologies, along with electronics and semiconductors, in a broader process of status-
                                                        
20 Selig S. Harrison, “Japan and Nuclear Weapons,” in Selig S. Harrison, ed., Japan’s Nuclear Future, 
(Washington D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996), p. 23.  
21 Jeffrey W. Thompson and Benjamin L. Self, “Nuclear Energy, Space Launch Vehicles, and Advanced 
Technology: Japan’s Prospects for Nuclear Breakout,” in Benjamin L. Self and Jeffrey W. Thompson, 
eds., Japan’s Nuclear Option: Security, Politics and Policy in the 21st Century (Washington D.C.: Henry 
L. Stimson Center, 2003), pp. 172-173. 
22 William W. Radcliffe, “Origins and Current State of Japan’s Reconnaissance Satellite Program,” 
Studies In Intelligence Vol. 54, No. 3 (2010), pp 11-12; Moltz, Asia’s Space Race, p. 56. 
23 Suzuki, Uchū Kaihatsu 186-187. 
24 Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu, In Defense of Japan, pp 189-194.  
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enhancing civilian industrial “catch-up” with the U.S. and USSR, bereft of any explicit 
military angle.25 
 
New space threats and alliance demands  
Japan in the 1990s became increasingly conscious of security threats related to space 
creating an environment for the militarization of dual-use space technologies. North 
Korea’s test launch of a Taepodong-1 missile across the Japanese archipelago in August 
1998, the “Taepodong shock,” exposed Japan’s vulnerability to ballistic missiles. 
Subsequent tests from the mid-2000s—including the Nodong-1 medium range ballistic 
missile (MRBM) capable of striking most of Japan, and the Musudan/Taepodong-X 
intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), Taepodong-2, and KN-14 with ranges 
potentially reaching U.S. bases in Guam and even perhaps the continental United 
States—have served only to reinforce concerns. 
 
China’s test of a direct ascent ASAT system in January 2007 equated to another 
“Taepodong shock” moment, demonstrating Japan’s vulnerabilities to space-based 
capabilities and the broader challenge to the U.S.’s control of the global commons in 
space.26 Japanese policy-makers not only fear China’s growing capabilities via laser-
blinding and co-orbital ASAT technologies as part of its burgeoning counterspace 
capabilities but also the increasing integration of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
conventional and space capabilities to exercise military force and anti-access/anti-denial 
(A2/AD) across all four dimensions of warfare.27  
                                                        
25 For the Fundamental Policy of Japan’s Space Activities of 1978, 1984, 1989 and 1996, see JAXA, 
Fundamental Policy of Japan’s Activities, January 24, 1996, 
http://www.jaxa.jp/library/space_law/chapter_4/4-1-1-4/index_e.html. 
26 Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2008 (Tokyo: Urban Connections, 2008), p. 50.  
27 Bōeishōhen, Bōei Hakusho 2014 (Tokyo: Zaimushō Insatsukyoku, 2015), pp. 40, 107-108. 
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In turn, Japan’s growing anxieties have been compounded by concerns over U.S.-Japan 
alliance solidity. After the Cold War, Japan’s concerns over entrapment have been 
increasingly overtaken by the opposite concerns of strategic and technological 
decoupling from the U.S. and the risk of abandonment—concerns witnessed in Japan’s 
attempts to extract explicit guarantees from the U.S. that the scope of the security treaty 
extends to the Senkaku Islands, and recently heightened initially with the advent of the 
Donald J. Trump administration’s “America First” policies, determination to press U.S. 
allies on upping their own defense budgets and burden-sharing, and discussion of 
scenarios of Japan and South Korea possibly possessing their own nuclear deterrents, 
that hints at a U.S. policy of offshore balancing and potential abandonment of Japan.28 
 
Japan’s national disadvantages in military space vis-à-vis the U.S. have been recognized 
since the 1990s, and particularly in access to space-based ISR—disadvantages that 
deprive policy-makers of tactical and strategic autonomy over JSDF deployments and 
commitments to support the U.S. in conflict situations.29 Japanese leaders particularly 
                                                        
28 For recent analyses of Japanese fears of abandonment as dominant, see Andrew L. Oros, Japan’s 
Security Renaissance: New Politics and Policies for the Twenty-First Century (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2017), p. 112; and Adam P. Liff, “Policy by Other Means: Collective Self-Defense and 
the Politics of Japan’s Postwar Constitutional Reinterpretations”, Asia Policy, No. 24 (2017), pp. 158-
159. Japanese concerns over the possible U.S. abandonment of Japan have been growing especially since 
the mid-2000s, either because of the risks posed by the U.S. oscillating between resurgence and 
unilateralism or relative hegemonic decline and neo-isolationism that could lead to its bypassing or 
disentangling itself from alliance interests with Japan. For a sample of such views from official 
government policy papers, see: Taigai Kankei Tasuku Fōsu, Nijū Isseiki Nihon Gaikō no Kihon 
Senryaku: Arata na Jidai, Arata na Bijon, Arata na Gaikō, Tokyo. 28 November, 2002, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kakugikettei/2002/1128tf.html, pp. 9-10; Anzen Hoshō to Bōeiryoku ni 
kansuru Kondankai, Anzen Hoshō to Bōeiryoku ni kansuru Kondankai Hōkokusho, Tokyo, August 2009, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ampobouei2/090928houkoku_j.pdf, p. 10-11; Arata na Jidai no Anzen 
Hoshō to Bōeiryoku ni Kansuru Kondankai, Arata na Jidai ni okeru Nihon no Anzen Hoshō to Bōeiryoku 
no Shōrai Kōsō: Heiwa Sōzō no Kokka o Mezashite, Tokyo, August 2010, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/shin-ampobouei2010/houkokusyo.pdf, pp.v-vi. For Japanese concerns 
about the possible neo-isolationism of the Trump administration and need to head this off, see Yabunaka 
Mitoji, Toranpu Jidai no Nichibei Shin Rūru (Tokyo: PHP Shinsho, 2017), pp. 92-93; “Tainichi 
Hatsugen Shingi wa”, Asahi Shimbun, February 6, 2017; and “Amid North Korea Threat, Tillerson Hints 
That ‘Circumstances Could Evolve’ for a Japanese Nuclear Arsenal,” Japan Times, March 19, 2017, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/03/19/national/amid-north-korea-threat-tillerson-hints-
circumstances-evolve-japanese-nuclear-arsenal/#.WOjEGFfw-b8. 
29 Sugio Takahashi, “Japanese Perceptions of the Information Technology-Revolution in Military Affairs: 
Toward a Defensive Information-Based Transformation”, in Emily O. Goldman and Thomas G Mahnken, 
 16 
bemoaned—as in the aftermath of the 1990-1991 Gulf War and North Korean missile 
launches from the mid-1990s onwards—that the JMOD and JSDF are effectively 
strategically blind without dependence on satellite reconnaissance, early-warning 
intelligence, and GPS provided by the U.S., so spelling risks of entrapment.30 However, 
Japan later took note of the 2010 NSSS and 2014 Quadrennial Review that asserted the 
U.S.’s need to maintain superiority in space through more resilient systems, including 
diversified ISR, SSA, MDA, and space-based precision strike; and that the U.S. can in 
part achieve this through partnering with “allies and other responsible nations,” and the 
expansion of access to allied ISR systems and collaborative development of space 
capabilities.31 The implication now was that Japan needed to build up its own space 
programs to stave off risks of abandonment. Japan’s 2016 Basic Space Plan fully 
endorses this approach, devoting its crucial opening statements to how Japan must boost 
independent military space capabilities (jiritsusei kakuho) in order to fully support the 
U.S.32  
 
Space positioned centrally in national security strategy  
Japan’s recognition of a changing external security environment has now initiated an 
effort for the significant militarization of its space programs, maneuvering space to the 
forefront of national security strategy and procuring key capabilities. Japan’s initial 
reaction to the “Taepodong shock” was, within months of the incident, to initiate its IGS 
                                                        
eds., The Information Revolution in Military Affairs in Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 
90-92. 
30 Tsuyoshi Sunohara, Tanjō Kokusan Supai Eisei: Dokuji Jōhōmo to Nichibei Dōmei (Tokyo: Nihon 
Keizai Shimbunsha, 2005), pp. 15-46; Paul Kallender-Umezu, “Profile: Hiroshi Imazu, former Chairman, 
Space Policy Committee, Liberal Democratic Party of Japan,” Space News, October 27, 2014: 
http://spacenews.com/42331profile-hiroshi-imazu-former-chairman-space-policy-committee-
liberal/#sthash.gJUOnfH5.dpuf. 
31 Department of Defense, National Security Space Strategy, p. 9; Department of Defense, Quadrennial 
Defense Review 2014, Washington D.C., Department of Defense, 2014, 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf, pp. 20, 33, 37. 
32  Uchū Kaihatsu Senryaku Honbu, Uchū Kihon Keikaku, January 9, 2015, 
http://www8.cao.go.jp/space/plan/plan2/plan2.pdf, pp. 4-5.  
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reconnaissance satellite constellation, dubbed as “multipurpose” and managed by the 
Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office to provide a layer of deniability about the system’s 
primary customers—the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) and JSDF. The “shock” allowed 
the repurposing of extant dual-use capabilities through a major new program of kokusan, 
or indigenous production. Next was the JSDF’s adoption of BMD in 1998, leading to 
Japan’s completed deployment by 2010 of the ASDF’s Patriot Advanced Capability-3 
(PAC-3) system, and the upgrading and testing with the U.S. from 2007 of the Maritime 
Self-Defense Force’s (MSDF) Aegis destroyer Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) BLK-IIA 
system, and plans for the augmentation of the MSDF’s Aegis destroyer fleet to eight in 
total.33 The Aegis system draws on space-based sensors and communications and is 
becoming increasingly capable of missile intercepts in space.34 Japan, in the wake of 
North Korea’s multiple missile tests in 2017, including several that display ICBM 
capability, is considering further bolstering its BMD capabilities by procuring the Aegis 
Ashore system and the JMOD included funding for the system in its 2018 budget 
request.35 
 
Japan in May 2008 passed a Basic Space Law that overturned the PPR by allowing the 
use of space for “defensive” rather than “non-military” functions.36 The Basic Law also 
mandated the establishment of the Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy (SHSP), 
which subsequently produced the national Basic Space Plan of June 2009. This first 
                                                        
33 Hideaki Kanda, Kazumasa Kobayashi, Hiroshi Tajima, and Hirofumi Tosaki, Nihon no Misairu Bōei: 
Henyō Senryaku Kankyō Shita no Gaikō Anzen Hoshō Seisaku (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Mondai 
Kenkyūjo, 2006), pp. 91-104. 
34 “Strategic Capabilities of SM-3 Block IIA Interceptors”, Mostly Missile Defense, 30 June 2016, 
https://mostlymissiledefense.com/2016/06/30/strategic-capabilities-of-sm-3-block-iia-interceptors-
june-30-2016/. 
35 “Japan favors Aegis Ashore over THAAD to bolster missile defenses: sources,” The Japan Times, 
May 13, 2017, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/05/13/national/japan-favors-aegis-ashore-thaad-
bolster-missile-defenses-sources/#.WXl9I2VCL-Y; Bōeishō, “Waga Kuni no Bōei to Yosan: Heisei 
30nendo Gaisan Yōkyū no Gaiyō”, August 2017, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/yosan/2018/gaisan.pdf, p. 13. 
36 “Uchū Kihon Hōan,” http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/utyuu/about2.html; Kazuto Suzuki, “A Brand 
New Space Policy or Just Papering Over a Political Glitch? Japan’s New Space Law in the Making,” 
Space Policy Vol. 24 (November 2008), pp. 171-174. 
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Basic Space Plan stated explicitly the need to utilize space for national security ends, to 
support the JSDF, to improve IGS, bolster secure satellite communications, develop an 
earth-monitoring MDA system for ISR and the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) 
regional (pan-Asian) positioning satellite system, and consider infrared EW satellites to 
reinforce the effectiveness of BMD through Shared Early Warning (SEW) with the 
U.S.37 The second Basic Space Plan of January 2013 confirmed these Japanese military 
space ambitions, and added the requirement for SSA.38  
 
The JMOD and JSDF have also now openly appropriated military-use space programs. 
The revised 2010 NDPG identified Japan’s need to respond to new challenges for access 
to outer space as part of the maintenance of the global commons, and for the JSDF to 
develop its own space-based ISR capabilities.39 The JMOD’s first Basic Space Plan in 
2009, citing the need to respond to China’s ASAT and other emergent space 
technologies, came replete with a shopping list of future space capabilities, including: 
SIGINT; space-based EW for BMD; QZSS for positioning and targeting; satellite 
hardening against kinetic, laser and electromagnetic attacks; SSA; and launch systems 
for tactical satellites (TacSats).40  
 
                                                        
37 Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy, Basic Plan for Space Policy: Wisdom of Japan Moves Space, 
2 June 2009, http://www8.cao.go.jp/space/pdf/basic_plan.pdf, pp. 7, 26. 
38  Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy, Basic Plan on Space Policy, 25 January 2013, 
http://www8.cao.go.jp/space/plan/plan-eng.pdf, 8; Naikakufu Uchū Senryakushitsu, Ūchū Kihon Keikaku 
(Tokyo: Shōbi Insatsu Kabushikikaisha, 2015), pp. 49-50. 
39 Japan Ministry of Defense, National Defense Program Guidelines for FY11 and Beyond, December 
17, 2010, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/pdf/guidelinesFY2011.pdf, pp. 3, 4, 15. 
40 Bōeisho Uchū Kaihatsu Riyō Iinkai, Uchū Kaihatsu Riyō ni Kansuru Kihon Hōshin ni Tsuite, 15 
January 2009, 
http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/meeting/board/uchukaihatsu/pdf/kihonhoushin.pdf. TacSats 
programs utilize microsatellites, and affordable and quick-response launch vehicles, to rapidly deploy 
capabilities for tactical imagery and data. For ORS, see: http://ors.csd.disa.mil/. Japan’s dual-use space 
programs directly mirror these efforts, with the Epsilon, as one of the world’s most advanced solid-fueled 
rockets, serving as a potential fast-access multipurpose launch vehicle for a range of military-use 
satellites. 
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The revised 2013 NDPG went further in promoting Japan’s military use of space. The 
JMOD’s July 2013 Defense Posture Review Commission report, in preparation for the 
revised NDPG, promoted space technologies as one of the key facets of defense policy, 
and particularly noted the need for SSA and ISR to cope with the growing tensions with 
the PLA Navy (PLAN) and paramilitary assets being used to assert the prosecution of 
China’s strategic push toward realizing territorial claims.41 The revised NDPG stressed 
the importance of securing outer space for the stability of the global commons, ISR, and 
the survivability of Japanese satellites through SSA.42 Then, the JMOD in 2014 devoted 
an entire section in the Defense of Japan white paper to “Efforts for development and 
use of space.”43 
 
Furthermore, the Abe administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS) of December 
2013 prioritizes space as a strategic domain and commits Japan to directly folding space 
policy into a subset of national defense policy. The NSS calls for the integration of space 
and security policy, and for the JSDF to further strengthen space-based ISR, SSA and 
MDA programs.44 The NSS provoked the JMOD in August 2014 to revise its own Basic 
Space Plan emphasizing the further integration of extant and future dual-use 
technologies, including all earth observation satellites, IGS, and MDA; the use of QZSS 
for military purposes; the development of a high bandwidth communications 
infrastructure that utilizes new dual-use technologies under JAXA, and creating a 
spaced based SEW system using JAXA reconnaissance satellites.45  
                                                        
41  Japan Ministry of Defense “Defense Posture Review Interim Report,” July 26, 2013, 
http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2013_chukan/gaiyou_e.pdf.  
42 Japan Ministry of Defense, National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and Beyond, 20.  
43 Bōeishō, Bōei Hakusho 2012 (Tokyo: Zaimushō Insatsukyoku, 2012), p. 156. 
44  National Security Strategy, December 17, 2013, 
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf, p. 19. 
45 Bōeishō Uchū Kaihatsu Riyō Suishin Iinkai, Uchū Kaihatsu Riyō ni Kansuru Kihon Hōshin ni Tsuite 
(Kaiseiban), August 28,  2014, 
http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/meeting/board/uchukaihatsu/pdf/kihonhoushin_201408.pdf. 
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Finally, the NSS provoked two revisions of Japan’s national Basic Space Plan, resulting 
in the latest versions released in 2015 and 2016 that even further elevate the importance 
of military space programs, using the open language of a “changing power balance in 
outer space, and shifting multipolarization of the previous U.S.-USSR bipolar 
structures,” and position national security above civilian purposes as first and 
indispensable in the list of rationales for Japan’s space programs.46  
 
 
Japan’s national space capabilities: forging the triad and arming the alliance  
 
Japanese breakout capabilities for internal balancing 
Japan’s evolution of a national military space strategy, emerging JSDF doctrines in 
relation to space-based threats and assets, and specific space capability procurement 
plans are suggestive of an emerging action-reaction dynamic, or even proto-space arms 
race, and apparent active power-balancing. Regarding internal power-balancing efforts, 
Japan has thus far demonstrated increasingly impressive follow through on its space 
capability build-up to a level that goes far beyond longstanding postwar constraints. 
This section and Table 2 below demonstrate that Japan has begun to procure a plethora 
of advanced military space capabilities matching, or in some cases even exceeding, 
those of China, and enabling far more robust deterrence by denial, as well as moves 
toward deterrence by punishment. 
 
                                                        
46  Uchū Kaihatsu Senryaku Honbu, Uchū Kihon Keikaku, January 9, 2015, 
http://www8.cao.go.jp/space/plan/plan2/plan2.pdf, pp. 4-5.  
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To counter regional threats, Japan is building out its space triad. For intelligence, Japan 
is already doubling its IGS satellite fleet, consisting of electro-optical and synthetic 
aperture radar technology (SAR), and is building new fleets of dual-purpose advanced 
optical and radar observation satellites.47 For communications and navigation, Japan has 
developed or is developing a satellite laser communications system based on the 
OICETS/Kirari test satellite and an advanced data relay satellite to deal with the 
burgeoning ISR data demands, and the full seven-satellite constellation QZSS system. 
Further, Japan is considering both space-based SIGINT and/or ELINT capabilities 
derived from the ETS-VIII program, despite already possessing an advanced land-based 
capability.48  
 
Japan’s MDA capabilities are currently vested respectively in the ALOS-2 and ALOS-
3 programs, the latter with a military-effective 80cm resolution that will also host a 
BMD EW sensor for the JMOD, and, therefore, the MSDF and ASDF. Discussions are 
ongoing about launching an MDA constellation based on Japan’s extant and emerging 
assets. ISR is being further augmented through JAXA’s SLATS (Super Low Altitude 
Test Satellite) program that uses highly advanced ion-engine technologies to enable 
satellites to maneuver and “dip” into much lower orbits to increase their resolution 
capabilities.  
 
                                                        
47 For program information, see Naikakufu Uchū Senryakushitsu, Heisei 26 Nendo Hosei Yosan Oyobi 
27 Nendo no Uchū Kankei Yosan An ni Tsuite (Sokuhōuchi), January 2015, 
http://www8.cao.go.jp/space/budget/h27/fy27yosan.pdf, pp. 2-3; Naikakufu Uchū Senryakushitsu, Heisei 
27 Nendo Gaisan Yōkyū ni okeru Uchū Kankei Yosan ni Tsuite  (Sokuhōchi), September 2014, 
http://www8.cao.go.jp/space/budget/h27/fy27gaisan.pdf, pp. 2-3; Yoshinori Komiya, Director-General, 
Office of National Space Policy, Cabinet Office, “New Basic Plan on Space Policy”, 26 February 2015, 
http://www.jsforum.or.jp/debrisympo/2015/pdf/06%20150226_DG_Komiya.pdf. 
48 Naikakufu Uchū Senryakushitsu, Nendo Gaisan Yōkyū ni okeru Uchū Kankei Yosan ni Tsuite  
(Sokuhōchi), September 2014, http://www8.cao.go.jp/space/budget/h27/fy27gaisan.pdf, pp. 2-3; 
Naikakufu Uchū Senryakushitsu Uchū Kihon Keikaku, http://www8.cao.go.jp/space/plan/keikaku.html, 
pp. 16, 18-19.  
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All of these systems will significantly support the JSDF’s ability to respond to 
conventional threats. The QZSS system, supporting the ASDF’s use of Joint Direct 
Attack Munitions (JDAM) to strike with pinpoint accuracy against an adversary’s 
missile bases, also opens up a range of means for Japan individually, but particularly in 
combination with the U.S., to look to negate many of China’s deterrent capabilities.  
 
For the counterspace component of the triad, in addition to the MSDF’s already very 
extensive BMD procurements, hiding in plain sight, in the form of the ETS-VII satellite, 
Japan has developed remote and computer-controlled co-orbital ASAT technologies and 
possesses a range of technologies that can be quickly repurposed for fighting an orbital 
space battle through applying to a wide range of small and microsatellite platforms the 
ability to conduct approach and close proximity maneuvering and docking. Further, 
Japan’s Responsive Small Satellites (RSS) series, resembling the U.S. Air Force’s 
TacSat series, will be capable of providing quick-launch, tactical ISR and 
communications capabilities of particular use to GSDF commanders in the field. Japan 
has also experimented with technologies (although currently mothballed) such as the 
robot space plane Hypersonic Flight Experiment (HYFLEX), similar to the USAF’s X-
37B, and that might even function as a space bomber for global strike.49  
 
Japan’s already advanced status in launch vehicles as the other main component of the 
triad further augments its position as a recessed nuclear power, providing it with the 
ultimate potential for internal balancing. Japan’s political willingness to breach the 
                                                        
49  For ETS-VII, see JAXA, “Engineering Test Satellite VII “KIKU-7” (ETS-VII)” 
http://www.jaxa.jp/projects/sat/ets7/index_e.html; for Japan’s hypersonic and robotic capabilities, see 
JAXA, ‘Hypersonic Flight Experiment “HYFLEX”’, 
http://www.jaxa.jp/projects/rockets/hyflex/index_e.html/. Regarding SmartSat, most of the digital data 
has disappeared, but see In Defense of Japan , pp.164-7. For U.S. global strike, see Bruce M. De Blois, 
Richard L. Garwin, R. Scott Kemp, and Jeremy C. Marwell, “Space Weapons: Crossing the Rubicon,” 
International Security Vol. 29, No. 2 (2004), pp. 68-74. 
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Three Non-Nuclear Principles and to produce and possess nuclear weapons remains 
uncertain, but the technological barriers in regard to outer space certainly continue to 
lower. The U.S.’s Rumsfeld Commission had already concluded by 1998 that Japan’s J-
I and M-V programs were readily convertible to ballistic missiles, even comparing the 
M-V rocket to the U.S. MX Peacekeeper ICBM.50 The Epsilon, as the M-V’s successor 
and one of the world’s most advanced solid fuel rockets, offers an even more directly 
convertible ICBM capable of mobile launch-on-demand, and potentially convertible to 
submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) status.51  
 
Japan has conducted a series of dual-use technology tests that could serve for nuclear 
warhead reentry vehicles. One test used a Russian-built ICBM re-entry vehicle and 
service module derived from the OGCh Fractional Orbital Bombardment System and 
launched on the missile-convertible M-3SII. The credibility of any Japanese nuclear 
launch system would further be augmented by the centimeter-accuracy of the QZSS 
system, assuming its survivability to cyber or kinetic attack. Japan might then look to 
deploy these developing missile and warhead technologies as SLBMs on the MSDF’s 
Sōryū submarines that appear adaptable for mounting sea-launched missiles. In totality, 
Japan’s advancement in space technologies is enabling it to edge toward all the key 
components of a latent nuclear delivery system for a second-strike force de frappe or 
tactical nuclear force. Such a capability would serve as a useful deterrent against North 
Korean and Chinese assets and fit with recent Japanese debates on the need for an 
autonomous strike capability, whether conventional or nuclear, to augment deterrence 
                                                        
50  Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, July 15, 1998, 
http://fas.org/irp/threat/missile/rumsfeld/pt1_china.htm. 
51 For Epsilon see JAXA, “Epsilon Launch Vehicle,” http://global.jaxa.jp/projects/rockets/epsilon/. 
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by denial and punishment and U.S.-Japan cooperation.52 Indeed, in reaction to North 
Korea’s successive missile tests, the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 2017 
initiated studies on not just the augmentation of BMD for deterrence by denial but now 
the procurement of cruise missiles—again in part reliant on network–centric warfare 
and space sensors for targeting —for striking missile bases and assist in the deterrence 
by punishment.53 The chair of the LDP study, Onodera Itsunori, was subsequently 
reappointed Minister of Defense in July 2017. The JMOD seemed to then move a step 
closer to cruise missiles in inserting in its budget request for 2018 a program for research 
into missiles with stealth technology that resemble Boeing’s AGM-86 air-launched 
cruise missiles.54 
 
Japan’s intent is demonstrated by its growing use of budgetary resources, made possible 
due to the dual-use justification of the space budget allowing for the leveraging and 
effective virement of funds into military-applicable technologies even if these 
expenditures are not officially counted as part of the defense budget. In fiscal 2015, 
Japan spent around ¥595 billion (roughly US$5.9 billion) on space-related programs, of 
which ¥245 billion has been devoted to BMD and ¥352 billion on the “official” space 
program. Within this ¥352 billion figure, at a conservative count, approximately forty 
percent is earmarked for dual-use space programs. Japan plans to raise its space budget 
from the ¥350 billion level to around ¥500 billion annually.55 The increasingly military-
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Shimbun, March 30, 2017. 
54 Bōeishō, “Waga Kuni no Bōei to Yosan: Heisei 30nendo Gaisan Yōkyū no Gaiyō”, August 2017, 
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oriented nature of the budget means that Japan could be in effect adding to its defense 
outlays, outside the formal JMOD expenditure and one percent of GNP framework, the 
equivalent of five to ten per cent of the current budget. 
 
Space capabilities in service of the U.S.-Japan alliance 
Japanese internal balancing in the domain of space is increasingly matched by similar 
external balancing via the U.S.-Japan alliance and designed to mitigate abandonment. 
These efforts in space supersede greatly Japan’s prior minimalist alliance contribution; 
enhance its strategic cooperation with the U.S.; expand its commitment to defensive 
responsibilities alongside the U.S. outside its immediate territory; integrate its 
capabilities with those of the U.S.; and not only facilitate but indeed have been largely 
responsible for initiating the breach on the ban of the exercise of CSD.  
 
The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC), or the “two-plus-two”, 
inserted in its June 2011 Joint Statement that the alliance, in addition to ongoing bilateral 
BMD projects, would strengthen cooperation on “other evolving threats, such as to outer 
space” and specifically in SSA, MDA, QZSS, and dual-use sensors.56 The U.S.-Japan 
First Comprehensive Dialogue on Space of March 2013 agreed that QZSS would form 
the direct backup system for GPS in the event of a conflict, and solidified collaboration 
in SSA and MDA.57 In the October 2013 SCC, the partners agreed to further strengthen 
                                                        
56 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee, Toward a 
Deeper and Broader US-Japan Alliance: Building on 50 Years of Partnership,” June 21, 2011, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/pdfs/joint1106_01.pdf, pp. 7, 9. 
57 Department of State, “Joint Statement from the Second Meeting of the Japan-US Comprehensive 
Dialogue on Space,” March 11, 2014, Washington D.C., 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/03/205939.htm. The dialogue involves from Japan: Foreign Policy 
Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Office of National Space Policy, Cabinet Office; MEXT; JMOD; 
Japan Coast Guard; JAXA, and Ministry of Environment. For earlier proposals for U.S.-Japan cooperation 
in GPS and QZSS, see Kurt M. Campbell, Christian Beckner and Yuki Tatsumi, “US-Japan Space Policy: 
A Framework for 21st Century Cooperation,” Washington D.C., Center for Security and International 
Studies (July 2003), http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/taskforcereport.pdf, pp. 15-18.  
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BMD cooperation and deploy SM-3 Block IIA, a second AN/TPY-2 radar and establish 
a bilateral Defense ISR Working Group for the U.S. to support space-based military 
ISR.58 In the Second Comprehensive Dialogue on Space of May 2014, Japan’s space 
assets were declared “indispensable” for U.S.-Japan security and that JAXA would 
provide SSA data to U.S. Strategic Command; and the Third and Fourth Comprehensive 
Dialogues of September 2015 and May 2017 stressed SSA and MDA bilateral 
cooperation and information-sharing.59   
 
In it explicit support of the U.S. “rebalance” through the revision of the U.S.-Japan 
Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, the Abe administration has further promoted 
bilateral military space projects. The SCC Joint Statement of April 2015 reiterated the 
importance of BMD, JAXA’s provision of SSA, and developing new and resilient space 
capabilities.60 The revised Defense Guidelines for the first time devote an entire section 
to bilateral cooperation in outer space. Japan and the U.S. are committed to cooperation 
in SSA and MDA, share information about emerging threats to space systems, and 
develop concomitant resiliency of their systems, including “hosted payloads” (civilian 
satellites carrying military payloads). The JSDF and U.S. are mandated to:  
 
continue to cooperate and to contribute to whole-of-government efforts in 
utilizing space in such areas as: early warning; ISR; positioning, 
                                                        
58 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee, Toward a 
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59 Department of State, “Joint Statement from the Second Meeting of the Japan-U.S. Comprehensive 
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 27 
navigation, and timing; SSA; meteorological observation; command, 
control, and communications; and ensuring the resiliency of the relevant 
space systems that are critical for mission assurance. In cases where their 
space systems are threatened, the Self-Defense Forces and the United 
States Armed Forces will cooperate, as appropriate, in mitigating risk and 
preventing damage. If damage occurs, they will cooperate, as appropriate, 
in reconstituting relevant capabilities.61 
 
Japan’s determination to expand cooperation with the U.S. into the militarization of 
outer space has in turn functioned as a persistent and principal driver for the eventual 
breach on the ban on the exercise of CSD with deep ramifications for the alliance and 
Japanese security policy overall. For effective real-time operation of space-related BMD 
systems, Japan and the U.S. require the increasing integration of bilateral information-
sharing and command and control. Japan’s Aegis system is highly interoperable, 
utilizing the same capabilities in maritime and space-based sensor technologies, data 
linking, and the co-developed SM-3 BLK-IIA missile. The MSDF’s Aegis system is 
inherently mobile and deployable alongside U.S. Navy assets whether in and around 
Japan or in other waters, thus raising the expectation that the U.S. will request Japanese 
BMD support in a variety of contingencies outside the traditional scope of the security 
treaty. Japanese defense planners denied initially that BMD carried implications for 
CSD, but their U.S. counterparts consistently and publicly stressed that for the system’s 
optimal deployment in support of the alliance it was necessary for Japan to lift the ban 
on the exercise the right.62  
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Consequently, Japan’s increasing acceptance of this technological and strategic logic 
meant that the BMD system and contingency scenarios for its usage were presented by 
the Abe administration in 2014-15 as some of the most prominent and compelling 
justifications for lifting the ban on the exercise of CSD.63 Japan’s lifting of the ban in 
part necessitated by BMD clearly frees up other areas of U.S.-Japan CSD activities in 
outer space as identified above, as well as potentially opening up the full gamut of U.S.-
Japan alliance cooperation to CSD under the “three new conditions”, so demonstrating 
that space is a decisive driver of broader change across Japanese security policy. Indeed, 
Minister of Defense Onodera commented in August 2017 that, in response to North 
Korea’s claim it might target the U.S. territory of Guam to demonstrate its missile 
capabilities, Japan could consider BMD intercepts in line with CSD.64 
 
The militarization of space programs under the framework of the alliance and CSD 
represents, therefore, a fundamental shift in Japan’s regional military role. Japan’s 
acquisition of ISR systems and QZSS, increasingly linked together and with U.S. 
systems via data fusion, now provide a “triple play” of advanced space technologies that 
greatly multiply Japanese deterrent power, and more significantly the U.S.-Japan 
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alliance’s deterrent power, through both denial and punishment, vis-à-vis China’s 
capabilities.  
 
First, Japan’s new capabilities will provide a persistent and pervasive ISR capability to 
track an adversary’s military deployments and exchange real-time data with the U.S., 
meaning that the PLA cannot easily hide from Japanese or U.S.-Japan alliance 
capabilities. Second, Japan’s acquisition of precision navigation and timing (PNT) strike 
capability through GPS and/or QZSS-guided ASDF JDAMs, means that the PLA, once 
exposed to space-based tracking, can also no longer evade being a target of Japanese 
and U.S. capabilities. Third, in addition to land and maritime ISR and even space-based 
SIGINT and ELINT, Japan’s move to acquire space-based EW through its own infrared 
satellites and by linking with the U.S. Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) and 
Defense Support Program (DSP) assets will mean that any adversary such as the PLA 
will find it hard not only to hide or evade but also to be able to strike back whether first 
or early against Japanese and U.S.-Japan capabilities. 
 
All this can be imagined to have major implications for the prosecution and outcome of 
specific conflict situations involving China. Japan has committed to the protection of 
U.S. maritime assets under the 2015 revised Defense Guidelines and CSD legislation.65 
For example, should a U.S. aircraft carrier strike group come under attack from the 
PLAN’s anti-ship cruise missiles (ACSM) either from Shang-class nuclear-powered 
submarines (SSN) or Kilo-class diesel-powered submarines, or even frigates, Japan’s 
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space assets would be pivotal in the bilateral defense effort. Japanese space-based ISG, 
ISR and MDA, in conjunction with other airborne and ground-based ISR systems such 
as the ASDF’s E-2C, E-767 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and 
UAVs, could track PLAN vessels and missile launches and exchange this data in real-
time with the U.S. Navy. The MSDF with this space-based ISR and MDA information 
could mobilize its fleet of P3-C and P-1 patrol aircraft to launch Harpoon missile strikes, 
or mobilize SH-60J/Ks from Izumo and Hyūga-class helicopter carriers for Mk46 and 
Type-97 torpedo attacks, against Chinese submarines. MSDF Sōryū attack submarines 
would also join the hunt.  
 
Against ground-launched DF-21D “carrier killer” anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM), 
Japanese space-based EW, in combination with the MSDF’s Aegis radar system, and 
linkages with U.S. sensor systems facilitated via Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter 
Air (NIFC-CA), would enable tracking of these from storage to launch sites, and then 
interception by the MSDF and U.S. BMD SM-3 Block IIA. To counter continued 
ground-based ASBM launches, or PLA Air Force use of maritime and long-range strike 
fighters such as the Su-30 or J-20 to launch ASCMs, Japan could mobilize its ASDF F-
2 or F-35A fighters for precision strikes at Chinese missile shore batteries and airfields 
utilizing JDAMs.  
 
Japan’s advanced space technologies looking to work in “seamless” cooperation with 
those of the U.S., a leitmotif of the revised Defense Guidelines, mark a significant new 
stage in the development and leveraging of JSDF capabilities and U.S.-Japan alliance 
cooperation. It may have a potentially key impact on the U.S.-Japan-China strategic 
balance. Such complementary and accretive space-based capabilities, exchange of ISR 
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data, and preparedness to buttress U.S. space infrastructure, clearly strengthen U.S.-
Japan alliance interoperability and its deterrence posture. Through the QZSS system and 
its role as a substitute for U.S. GPS, Japan places itself on the very front line as a primary 
target in a conflict with any adversary, but especially China. While obviating the risks 
of U.S. abandonment, Japan is actually undertaking renewed risks of entrapment, and 
so sacrificing the tenets of the Yoshida Doctrine as the cost of strategic commitment to 
the U.S. in space and maintenance of this aspect of the global commons.  
 
In turn, it can be envisaged that China might perceive these developments as even 
aggressive in orientation. Full spectrum dominance threatens to deprive China of the 
ability to hide, evade or strike back and to thus negate its own normal deterrence 
capabilities. The temptation, then might be for China to launch, in line with its doctrine 
of asymmetric warfare, preemptive or blanket kinetic, directed-energy or cyber strikes 
to degrade Japanese ISR assets and restore strategic parity in an impending conflict. In 
this sense, then, Japanese militarization of space activities could prove highly escalatory 
for U.S.-Japan-China security tensions.  
 
Domestic policy-making institutions and space militarization 
Japan’s militarization of space to pursue behaviors approximating to internal and 
external power balancing demonstrates the start of clear departures from the Yoshida 
Doctrine. These changes are also matched by shifts in the disposition of domestic 
agents and norms. 
 
Aligning policy structures for a military-strategic space orientation 
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Japan’s immobilism in space policy until the late 1990s displayed classic bureaucratic 
inter-jurisdictional and budgetary rivalries, combined with weak political oversight and 
coordination. NASDA, controlled by the Science and Technology Agency (STA), 
focused on the industrialization of space for the benefit of the Japanese economy and 
society. ISAS, controlled by the Ministry of Education (MOE), focused more on 
foundational space science. The MOE’s transformation into the Ministry of Education, 
Culture, Sports and Technology (MEXT) in 2001, and its absorption of STA and taking 
control of JAXA in 2003, created a bureaucratic powerhouse intent on safeguarding its 
budgets versus other agencies. Day-to-day development of Japan’s civilian and military 
space programs was largely split between MOE/MEXT and the rival Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI, later to become the Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry [METI]) also mainly interested in space for industrial policy. 
MEXT and METI contentions over jurisdictions and budgets compounded deficiencies 
in space policy, in part demonstrated by the expensive failure of an H-IIA launch and 
loss of two IGSs in November 2003.  
 
Japanese industrial manufacturing interests—primarily Mitsubishi Electric (Melco), 
NEC Corporation and Toshiba Corporation (until NEC and Toshiba’s forced merger in 
2000) as the major satellite makers, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) and 
Ishikawajima-Harima Corporation, and the Keidanren’s (Japan Business Federation) 
Space Activities Promotion Council—during this period were fixed primarily on the 
civilian commercial rather than military possibilities of space, with other sectors of the 
Japanese economy such as finance similarly disinterested in defense procurement for 
perception of the limited commercial benefits and potential negative reputational 
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reasons of involvement in arms production.66 Following rising bilateral trade frictions 
and the 1990 “satellite agreement,” Japan became obliged by the U.S. to open up its 
commercial space procurement. Melco, NEC and Toshiba, facing new competition for 
their increasingly capable but expensive systems, began to pressurize the Japanese 
government to develop a dual-use space market that would broaden military 
procurement opportunities and protect this domestic market from U.S. competition.67 
 
Rigid divides between civilian and national security policy-making structures also 
promoted policy continuity. The Prime Minister’s Office housed and exercised direct 
control over the Space Activities Commission (SAC) that had the overall purview of 
space policy, and strictly separated the SAC from any relationship with the JDA also 
under the control of the Prime Minister’s Office. The Cabinet Office lacked any 
mandate or structures to exert top-down political control over space programs. Japan’s 
political leadership was also for most of this period concerned primarily with civilian 
space usage. The defense-oriented elements of the long-governing LDP did 
increasingly emphasize the importance of military space technology, but it was still the 
LDP mainstream that originally sponsored and maintained the PPR as a means to 
reassure domestic and international opinion that Japan was not fundamentally 
diverging from its anti-militaristic principles (although, as with the Three Non-Nuclear 
Principles of 1967, the LDP was careful to enunciate in the National Diet a resolution 
rather than binding national law that might close off options for military space 
activities). Japan’s main opposition parties, the Japan Socialist Party, Japan Communist 
Party, Democratic Socialist Party, and the Kōmeitō (Clean Government Party), were 
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strongly opposed to the militarization of space for anxiety of entrapment in U.S.-led 
Cold War conflicts.68 
 
Japan’s political and bureaucratic leadership, however, has been provoked since the 
late 1990s into asserting greater strategic control over space policy by evident problems 
of devolving responsibility to MEXT, JAXA and METI. Japanese political leaders’ 
increased assertiveness over military space strategy reflected general trends for the 
strengthening of the core executive over security policy.69 Following the “Taepodong 
shock”, the Cabinet Office’s Council for Science and Technology Policy (CSTP) from 
2000 onwards formulated, under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Koizumi 
Junichirō, a series of basic space strategies released in 2001, 2002 and 2004 that 
represented initial attempts to assert central control over space policy and fold it into a 
dual-use national security architecture, placing security and crisis management as first 
in the list of Japanese priorities, emphasizing the development of the IGS constellation, 
maintenance of solid-propellant rocket technology, and establishment of QZSS.70  
 
The next stage was the intervention of Kawamura Takeo, later Chief Cabinet Secretary 
during the administration of Prime Minister Asō Tarō from 2008-2009. The 
“Kawamura Initiative”, via the LDP’s internal National Space Strategy Planning Group 
(NSSPG), created momentum for the passage of the 2008 Basic Space Law that placed 
the Cabinet Office through the SHSP in overall control of space policy, overturned the 
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PPR, and recognized the need for augmented military space capabilities.71 The SHSP, 
with Kawamura as Deputy Director General, produced a report in April 2009 
recommending extensive Cabinet Office control over space policy and budgeting. 
 
The DPJ government in 2009 brought plans for a new Space Agency (Uchūchō) that 
would swallow the SHSP and space functions of other ministries and generated near 
implacable opposition from MEXT.72 The DPJ eventually relented and returned to 
building up the influence of the SHSP, establishing in June 2012 the Office of National 
Space Policy (ONSP), with a Space Policy Commission (SPC), chaired by the prime 
minister, to coordinate national security priorities. This system of dual control under 
the SHSP via the ONSP and NSPC lacked, however, a clear legal statement of which 
actor controlled budgetary issues, and temporarily created room for inter-ministerial 
haggling. For example, the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center, JMOD and Ministry 
of Finance in December 2013 all rejected attempts by METI to inject itself as a primary 
space player when senior official Nishimoto Junya, a former director of METI’s Space 
Industry Office, sought for the ONSP to select METI-budgeted satellites over MEXT’s 
as Japan’s MDA system.  
 
This failure—following the Abe administration’s establishment of the NSS the same 
month, and Japanese promises to the U.S. in the October SCC over space cooperation—
produced decisive intervention when Hiroshi Imazu, Chair of the LDP’s Space Policy 
Subcommittee of the Special Committee for Space and Ocean Development, former 
Vice-Minister for Defense, and an advocate of a highly militarized space policy, 
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engineered an LDP report in June 2014 recommending a Japanese version (Nihon-ban) 
of the U.S. NSSS.73  This report pushed the ONSP to produce its own “Mid-Term 
Strategy” in August 2014, even more aggressive in outlook than the January 2013 Basic 
Plan.74 Imazu’s intervention, along with that of Abe himself and the LDP, essentially 
returned control of space policy to the ONSP and the Cabinet Office, and thus bolstered 
political leadership.  
 
The ONSP consolidated its grip by removing JAXA from under MEXT’s direction and 
relocating it under the ONSP itself. Then, the JMOD’s influence in space policy has 
grown as it increasingly becomes the prime customer for and beneficiary of Japan’s 
militarizing space capabilities.75 JMOD staff populate the ONSP and blocked METI’s 
attempts to budget its MDA constellation.76 JAXA, often seen as preserving the civilian 
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rationale, has readily dropped its previously “principled” stance on non-military use 
and is now actively promoting military-use programs in order to preserve its budgets.   
 
The LDP has, therefore, moved firmly toward the more overt military use of space 
since the “Taepodong-shock.” Successive LDP administrations and party grandees 
have led the charge for space militarization, promoting and passing the Basic Law and 
Basic Space Plans. Abe has positioned space at the forefront of national security 
strategy. LDP leaders have yet more ambitious plans. Similarly, the DPJ strongly 
converged with the LDP on the need for the military use of space as early as the mid-
2000s when it supported the Basic Space Law. Maehara Seiji, a DPJ defense hawk, as 
State Minister for Space Development from 2009 to 2010, even attempted to wrest 
space policy from MEXT in order to push through a global ISR constellation to bolster 
IGS and a full QZSS constellation.77 DPJ Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko, a former 
JSDF member, committed Japan to the “industrialization” of space, a euphemism for 
militarization, given that his government was establishing Cabinet Office control over 
the QZSS system which, although dual-use in nature, is a central military navigation 
platform.78 Even the dovish New Kōmeitō has supported such policies in coalition with 
the LDP.79 
 
Japanese industrial manufacturing interests, long attuned to the potential of military 
market from the 1990s onwards as an untapped source of procurement budgets to 
preserve the national defense industrial base, have strongly supported space 
                                                        
77 Paul Kallender-Umezu, “Profile, Seiji Maehara, Foreign Minister, Japan: Building on Success,” Space 
News, 19 October 2010, p. 22.  
78 Democratic Party of Japan, Making Decisions to Get Things Moving. The Democratic Party of Japan’s 
Manifesto. Our Responsibilities for Now and the Future, Tokyo 2012, 
http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto/manifesto2012.pdf, pp. 28, 31. 
79 The LDP and New Kōmeitō formed a project team, consulting more than thirty times, for formulation 
of the 2008 Basic Space Law; see Aoki, “Current Status,” p. 365.  
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militarization. The Space Activities Promotion Council of the Keidanren, Japan’s most 
prominent and influential business association, has consistently lobbied for the 
promotion of military activities since 2004, initially asking for the government to revise 
the PPR, and now focusing on national security as the prime rationale and market for 
space programs.80 
 
Eroding normative prohibitions on space militarization 
Japan’s increasing alignment of party political, bureaucratic and industrial interests has 
also been accompanied by apparent normative change. The 1969 PPR originally 
committed Japan to the development of space capabilities “limited to peaceful 
purposes” (heiwa no mokuteki ni kagiri) and thus an anti-militaristic principle and norm 
generally accepted by Japanese political elites and broader society, and that went 
beyond the UN’s 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) allowing only for the non-aggressive 
military use of space.81  
 
The erosion of the PPR began with the “Taepodong shock” that created an environment 
conducive for the IGS program. This initial shift to the defensive use of space was 
presented as fitting within PPR apparent parameters: IGS satellites were classified as 
information-gathering (jōhō shūshū) and “multi-purpose” (tamoku-teki) despite their 
essentially primary military rationale.82 But thereafter the “exclusively peaceful” use 
                                                        
80 Nippon Keidanren, Uchū Kaihatsu Riyō no Sōki Chakujitsu na Suishin o Nozomu, June 22, 2004, 
https://www.keidanren.or.jp/japanese/policy/2004/055.html; Waga Kuni Uchū Kaihatsu Riyō Suishin 
Muketa Teigen, June 20, 2006 https://www.keidanren.or.jp/japanese/policy/2006/046/honbun.html; 
Kokka Senryaku toshite no Uchū Kaihatsu Riyō no Suishin ni Muketa Teigen, April 12, 2010, 
https://www.keidanren.or.jp/japanese/policy/2010/029honbun.pdf, pp. 1-2; Uchū Kihonhō ni Motozuku 
Uchū Kaihatsu Riyō no Suishin ni Muketa Teigen, May 17, 2011, 
https://www.keidanren.or.jp/policy/2011/049honbun.pdf, p. 2; Uchū Kihon Keikaku ni Muketa Teigen, 
November 18, 2014, https://www.keidanren.or.jp/policy/2014/098_honbun.pdf, p. 2. 
81 Oros, Normalizing Japan, p. 129. For the PPR see: Waga Kuni ni Okeru Uchū no Kaihatsu Oyobi Riyō 
no Kihon ni Kansuru Ketsugi, May 9, 1969, http://www.jaxa.jp/library/space_law/chapter_1/1-1-1-
4_j.htmland; and Setsuko Aoki, Nihon no Uchū Senryaku (Tokyo: Keio Gijiku Daigaku Shuppankai, 
2006), pp. 174-177. 
82 Oros, Normalizing Japan, pp. 140-141. 
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of space norm has been abandoned. The Basic Space Law jettisoned the PPR, passing 
the National Diet with 221 in favor, and only fourteen against, with cross-party support 
from the LDP, DPJ, and New Kōmeitō.83  
 
Crucially, Japanese public opinion, often thought as the final “immovable object” of 
anti-militarist principles, has shown itself to be flexible about the military use of 
space.84 The IGS and introduction of BMD aroused little public opposition.85 Cabinet 
Office opinion polls demonstrate rising support for the JSDF to undertake BMD since 
2006, with increases from sixteen to twenty-seven percent between 2006 and 2015 for 
those seeing BMD as one of the key rationales for the JSDF’s existence, and from 
thirteen to twenty-one percent across the same years for those seeing BMD as a key 
role of the JSDF. 86  The Cabinet Office has since 2015 posed survey questions 
regarding the JSDF’s future role in contributing to the “stable use” of outer space, 
another euphemism for military use, and attracted an early favorable response.87  
 
Conclusion: Japan’s militarization of security and erosion of the Yoshida 
Doctrine. No longer hiding in plain sight? 
Japan’s military space programs have only even really been hiding in plain sight given 
their dual-use camouflage, but the framework of analysis presented in this paper now 
                                                        
83 New Kōmeitō reported itself satisfied in applying brakes (hadome) on the militarization of space, 
insisting on a commitment in the law for the use of space in accordance with the constitution’s pacifism; 
New Kōmeitō, “Party Pushes for Peaceful Use of Outer Space”, May 22, 2008, 
https://www.komei.or.jp/en/news/2008/0522.html. 
84  Richard Friman, Peter J. Katzenstein, David Leheny, and Nobuo Okawara, “Immovable Object? 
Japan’s Security Policy in East Asia,” in Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi, eds., Beyond Japan: 
The Dynamics of East Asian Regionalism (Itahca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2006), pp. 85-
107. 
85 Midford, Rethinking Japanese Security, p. 186.  
86 Asagumo Shimbunsha, Bōei Handobukku 2007 (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbunsha, 2007), pp. 814-815; 
Asagumo Shimbunsha, Bōei Handobukku 2015 (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbunsha, 2015), pp. 840-841; 
Naikakufu Daijin Kanbō Seifu Kōhōshitsu, Jieitai Bōei Mondai ni Kansuru Yoron Chōsa, January 2015, 
http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h26/h26-bouei/2-4.html. 
87 Naikakufu Daijin Kanbō Seifu Kōhōshitsu, Jieitai Bōei Mondai ni Kansuru Yoron Chōsa, January 
2015, http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h26/h26-bouei/zh/z11.html. 
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openly demonstrates that Japan is emerging as a major military space power. Just as 
importantly, Japan’s militarization of space demonstrates fundamental challenges to 
the continuity of the Yoshida Doctrine and heralds radical shifts in its overall security 
stance.  
 
This paper’s analysis has demonstrated systematic and deep challenges to the Yoshida 
Doctrine’s central tenets in four ways, as summarized again in Table 1. First, it has 
shown that Japan’s former strategic calculus over security policy is fundamentally 
shifting, becoming increasingly dominated by international systemic pressures, 
concerns over abandonment rather than entrapment, the need to more actively maintain 
alliance ties, and to a build-up of capabilities for internal and external balancing—all 
indicating a shift to a more proactive military stance. 
 
Second, Japan has embedded space at the forefront of national and U.S.-Japan alliance 
security strategy and deploys a triad of national space capabilities in launch vehicles, 
satellites, and counterspace that competes with, or even gains superiority over, if seen 
in the context of ever-closer interoperability with U.S. space resources, those of its 
main security adversary China. Japan’s space technologies even now hint at offensive 
power projection and augmenting a recessed nuclear option for deterrence by 
punishment. Thus, Japan is becoming a far more capable and complete military actor 
overall, especially when combined with the build-up of network-centric-type 
technologies yielding significant leveraging of JSDF military capabilities to participate 
in full-spectrum dominance in a range of contingencies, even if the quantitative 
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resource base has not greatly increased.88 These capabilities mark a step change beyond 
the constrained stance of the Yoshida Doctrine. 
 
Moreover, Japan’s military space policy broadly reflects, and indeed in many ways 
leads and actively facilitates trends in the build-up of capabilities in other linked 
military dimensions. As noted earlier, the 2013 NDPG and MTDP seek to create a 
DJDF, and expanded the variety of advanced weapons platforms, including: MSDF 
Aegis destroyers, multi-mission destroyers, Sōryū attack submarines, Izumo and 
Hyūga-class light helicopter carriers, P-1 long-range patrol aircraft, ASDF F-35A fifth-
generation fighters and UAVs; and GSDF vertical and/or short take-off and landing 
troop transports, amphibious armored personnel carriers, and a proto-marine corps 
force. This represents a substantial expansion of Japanese military power overall, and 
the NDPG makes clear that central to this effort is superiority in ISR, improved 
command and control, and integration of JSDF operations across all three services and 
dimensions of activities—again all functions provided indispensably by space 
technologies.89 Japan’s militarization of space policy is not, therefore, a marginal or 
niche activity that cannot be used to gauge broader security change. In fact, space is 
now central in terms of concerted national defense planning efforts to upgrade and 
integrate significantly the JSDF’s qualitative capabilities. 
  
Third, the paper demonstrates that Japan’s policy structures, agents, and norms are not 
immutable. Japan has developed coordinating policy-making institutions that now 
supersede the structures associated with the reinforcement in the past of the Yoshida 
Doctrine and instead facilitate the rapid militarization of space and other aspects of 
                                                        
88 Japan Ministry of Defense, National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and Beyond, pp. 7-8. 
89 Japan Ministry of Defense, National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and Beyond, pp. 7-8. 
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security policy. Japan’s transforming security policy is underpinned by growing 
centralized political control and consensus as seen in the elevated role of the JMOD, 
Cabinet Office and NSC, and convergence between LDP and opposition policies on 
many security policy fundamentals.90 This process of the centralization and moves 
toward greater political and strategic orientation of policy-making supports and 
matches the changes observed across all aspects of security policy in recent years, 
including most importantly the establishment of Japan’s first NSC in December 2013.91 
Hence, whilst all domestic obstacles to overcoming the Yoshida Doctrine have not been 
swept aside entirely in Japan’s security policy, and as with all states security it remains 
a site of domestic political contestation, the clear trajectory in space and the other 
interlinked dimensions is toward a far more muscular military posture. 
 
Similarly, the militarization of space is illustrative of and strongly influences changes 
in normative attitudes and the erosion of anti-militaristic principles across Japan’s 
security policy, including intermittent breaches of the one per cent of GNP defense 
expenditure principle and now its explicit disownment in 2017 by the Abe 
administration; known breaches of the third of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles by 
allowing U.S. warships to enter Japan carrying tactical nuclear weapons; more recent 
restructuring of civilian control; the abandonment of the ban on exports of military 
technology to adopt instead the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment 
                                                        
90 Jeffrey Hornung, “With a Left Like This, Who Needs the Right?”, Japan Chair Platform, February 11, 
2011, http://csis.org/files/publication/110211_Hornung.pdf. 
91 For studies of Japan’s changing institutions and the increasing flexibility to devise security policy over 
the last decade and half, see Shinoda Tomohito, Kantei Gaikō: Seiji Rīdāshippu no Yukie (Tokyo: Asahi 
Shimbunsha, 2004); Adam P. Liff and Andrew S. Erickson, “From Management Crisis to Crisis 
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Strategic Studies, Vol. 40, No. 5 (2017), pp. 604-638; Sunohara Tsuyoshi, Nihon-ban NSC to wa Nanika? 
(Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 2014). 
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and Technology; and, of course, the abandonment of PRR, and now the breach on the 
ban of the exercise of CSD.92 
 
Fourth, the militarization of space programs indicates that Japan now has a new 
determination to use this power in the active service of national security and to depart 
on a new chapter in grand strategy: a boldness to establish new capabilities and to push 
the integration of its capabilities with those of the U.S. in order to greatly strengthen 
the alliance and to operationalize the types of bilateral military cooperation in regional 
contingencies envisaged by the revised Defense Guidelines and CSD legislation. 
Japan’s lack of reticence to form part of the frontline of deterrence, and to move toward 
abandoning hedging and to accept the risks of entrapment and make full operational 
commitments to U.S. regional strategy, as seen in the case of space, are hardly redolent 
of the Yoshida Doctrine. 
 
In conclusion, therefore, the paper asserts that Japanese space activities indicate a 
trajectory heading away from the Yoshida Doctrine toward Japan as a more capable 
military power and more fully committed U.S. ally. Abe’s security orientation is not a 
transitory phenomenon, but rather the shape of things to come in Japanese security 
policy. The militarization of space policy stands as a harbinger of broader military 
transformation. Japan’s space capabilities are now hiding less in plain sight and the 
implications for regional security come into sharper question. Japan will provide a 
strong and proactive contribution to the U.S. “rebalance” to East Asia and future 
                                                        
92 For Abe’s admission of the abandonment in effect of the one percent of GNP limit on defense 
expenditures, see “Boeihi ‘1% ni Osaeru Kangaekata nai’”, Asahi Shimbun, March 3, 2017. For breaches 
of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, “Iwayuru “Mitsuyaku” 
Mondai ni Kansuru Chōsa Kekka,” March 2010, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mitsuyaku/kekka.html. 
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military strategies. In fact, the increasing integration of Japan’s space and other military 
capabilities with those of the U.S. may even prove provocative to potential adversaries 
such as China. North Korea has clearly stated that it perceives Japan’s satellite and 
QZSS program as military in nature, and China continues to accuse Japan of procuring 
destabilizing military capabilities. All this may reinforce the emergent security 
dilemmas in the region.93
                                                        
93 “North Korea Accuses Japan's Satellite Launch as an Attempt to ‘Spy on Pyongyang”, South China 
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August 9, 2017, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2017-08/09/content_4788352.htm. 
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Table 1: Central tenets and baselines of change for the Yoshida Doctrine and the impact of Japan’s space militarization 
YOSHIDA DOCTRINE’S CENTRAL TENETS  JAPAN’S MILITARIZATION OF SPACE AND IMPACT ON CENTRAL TENETS 
OF THE YOSHIDA DOCTRINE 
Assessment of international security environment  
 USSR capabilities and intent primary security concern; China’s capabilities secondary 
concerns 
 
 China’s space capabilities and intent primary concern (“ASAT shock”, A2/AD in space), 
North Korea’s ballistic missile capability (“Taepodong-shock”) and intentions 
secondary 
 Regional security dilemmas stable  Japan-China upward security dilemma/arms race in outer space 
 Confidence in non-abandonment by U.S.  Concerns of abandonment by U.S. due to alliance capability asymmetries in outer space 
 Concerns primarily over entrapment by U.S.  Reduced concerns over entrapment by U.S. 
 Japanese minimalist military commitment to U.S. feasible  Japanese strong military commitment to U.S. essential in space 
Japan’s national military capabilities  
 Exclusively defense-oriented defense  
 
 Proactive defense posture in space (Basic Space Law 2008, Basic Space Plans 2009, 
2013, 2015, 2016; JMOD Basic Space Plans 2009, 2014; NSS 2013; NDPG 2010 & 
2013) 
 Limited capabilities for deterrence by denial; no power projection/offensive capabilities 
for deterrence by punishment 
 Power projection/offensive capabilities acquired in space (GPS/QZSS; JDAM targeting; 
ASAT counterspace; global strike) 
 Highly limited militarization of outer space  Comprehensive militarization and triad of space capabilities (space-based ISR, MDA 
SIGINT, ELINT, GPS, SSA, ASAT, BMD) 
 Non-nuclear defense posture  Space solid-fuel delivery, re-entry vehicles and targeting systems enhance recessed 
nuclear option 
 Defense budget limited to 1% GNP  Defense budget increased outside one percent GNP by expanding dual-use space budget 
Degree of Japan’s security commitments to U.S.  
 Restricted bilateral strategic cooperation with U.S.; avoidance of entanglement 
 
 Enhanced bilateral cooperation and conjoining of strategy in space (U.S.-Japan 
Comprehensive Space Dialogue, revised U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines 2015) 
 Defensive responsibilities restricted to Japan  U.S.-Japan space cooperation enhances bilateral alliance deterrence perimeter in East 
China Sea and South China Sea 
 Non-integration of JSDF and U.S. military capabilities 
 
 “Seamless” integration of U.S.-Japan capabilities in space (BMD, QZSS, MDA, SSA) 
 No transfer/sharing of military technologies  Transfer and sharing of space technologies (BMD) 
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 Non-exercise of collective self defense  Exercise of collective self-defense facilitated and obliged by bilateral space capabilities 
and cooperation, especially precipitated by BMD 
 Obfuscation of military commitments and hedging tactics  Space capabilities and alliance commitments on frontline of deterrence against China 
and cessation of hedging 
Degree of alignment of policy-makers in security policy  
 Fragmentation of central control over security policy   Centralization of security policy-making for space under Cabinet Office, SHSP, ONSP, 
SPC, NSC. JAXA moved from MEXT to ONSP control 
 Party political contestation over security policy, especially LDP versus opposition 
parties 
 Party policy convergence over security policy and space; LDP-DPJ consensus on 
militarization of space 
 Political-bureaucratic contestation over security policy  Political influence increases vis-à-vis bureaucratic interests in security policy-making 
for space. LDP exerts dominance over bureaucrats 
 Civilian control dominates over defense bureaucracy and strong bureaucratic inter-
jurisdictional rivalries 
 Civilian control reduced over defense bureaucracy and weaker inter-ministerial rivalries. 
MEXT-METI-JMOD enhanced cooperation under Cabinet Office direction  
 Defense-industrial interests restricted influence on security policy  Defense-industrial interests converge to influence security policy-making for space. 
Keidanren prioritizes militarization of space; MHI, Melco, KHI strong proponents of 
military space policy 
Degree of durability of security policy norms  
 Anti-militaristic principles  PRR abandoned as anti-militaristic principle/norm. National Diet consensus on Basic 
Space Law 2008 
 Restrictions on the export of arms and military technology (1967 and 1976)  
 Three Non-Nuclear Principles (1967)  
 PPR space (1969)  PPR abandoned as anti-militaristic principle/norm 
 Civilian control  Public support of JSDF military activities in space, including BMD and other activities 
 Ban on the exercise of collective self-defense  
 1% GNP defense expenditure  
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Table 2: Japan’s triad of military/dual-use space capabilities compared to U.S. and China 
  UNITED STATES CHINA JAPAN 
COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE 
Surveillance 
satellites 
D D  D 
Electro-optical 5 x KH-11 Kennan (~15 cm) 
2 x KH-12 (Misty) 
1 x Enhanced Imaging Satellite 
(EIS) (Misty 2) (~10 cm) 
14 x Yaogan 
(~60-80 cm) 
 
 
4 x IGS Optical (~30-100 cm; to be 
doubled to  an 8-satellite 
constellation by 2025) 
ASNARO (~50 cm) 
ALOS-2, 3 (~80 cm) 
SLATS 
RSS series  
SAR 
 
 
3 x Lacrosse/Onyx (~30 cm) 
c. 3-5 x Topaz (~10 cm) 
7 x Yaogan 
 
3 x IGS Radar (~100 cm) 
ASNARO (~100 cm) 
RSS series 
MDA Wide range of space-based  
resources 
4-7 x Haiyang 
3 x Yaogan-IX Naval Ocean 
Surveillance System (NOSS) 
constellation, up to 21 counter-
naval satellites 
ALOS-3 
ASNARO series 
SLATS 
RSS series 
SSA D U D 
 c. 30 radars/telescopes, 2 x 
Geosynchronous SSA (GSSA),  
S-Band Space Fence, Space 
Surveillance Network (SSN), 
BMD radars 
 7 x FPS-5 
J/FPS-XX 
Bisei Spaceguard Center  (1 m 
telescope) 
BMD EW D R R 
 Defense Support Program 
DSP/Space Based Infrared System 
(SBIRS) 
Shijian 7 (SJ-7) & SJ-11-07 
experimental satellites 
ALOS-3 
Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) 
capability under research 
Tactical TacSat 1-4 U RSS series 
Space-based 
SIGINT 
D U R 
c. 5 x Mentor  ETS-VIII derivative 
Space-based 
ELINT 
D D R 
c. 3x Trumpet 
 
15 x Yaogan ETS-VIII derivative 
Military-use 
navigation/GPS 
D D D 
24 x GPS Precise Positioning 
Service (~3 m)  
35 x BeiDou-2 satellites by 
2020 (~10 cm) 
7 x QZSS by 2024 (~15 cm) 
COUNTERSPACE OFFENSIVE/DEFENSIVE 
ASAT D 
  
D D/L 
Direct ascent 
 
D/L D/L D/L 
Aegis SM-3 
SM-3 Block 2A 
THAAD 
Long March-6 
KT-1/ SC-19 
KT (or DN)-2 
KT (or DN)-2A 
Aegis SM-3 
SM-3 Block 2A 
 
Air-Launch 
 
D D D 
ASM-135 
ALASA 
Shenlong ASLET 
Laser blinding 
 
D D/R N/F 
MIRCL 
(to LEO) 
50-100 KW 
(600 km) 
Research on adaptive optics 
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Co-Orbital 
 
D/R D/R R/L 
NFIRE, 2 x XSS-11, 2 x MITx, 
Phoenix, ANGELS, TAOS 
Tsinghua-1, BX-1, SJ-12, CX-
3, SJ-7, SY-7, Shijian-15 
ETS-VII, SmartSat-2 HiMEOS 
HTV, debris removal satellite 
Global Strike D D D 
 2 x X-37B (& prior programs) WU-14 hypersonic Glide 
Vehicle 
HYFLEX/HOPE-X 
BMD D U D 
Sea-based 33 Aegis (5 cruisers [CGs] and 28 
destroyers [DDGs]): 16 in the 
Pacific 17 in the Atlantic Fleet. 
 Aegis (6 ships) 
Increasing to 8 
Land-based 30 x GMD interceptors 
1,100+ x PAC-3 batteries 
5 x THAAD 8-missile batteries 
SC-19 
DN-2 
PAC-3 
Networked D U D 
 Aegis Baseline 9, Naval Integrated 
Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-
CA) 
 Aegis Baseline 9, NIFC-CA 
LAUNCH/REENTRY VEHICLES 
Solid-fuel 
IRBM/ICBM 
D D L 
Minuteman III W78/MK12A, 
Minuteman III W87/MK21 
DF-4, DF-5A, DF-21A, DF-
21C, DF-31, DF-31A, DF-
31B, DF-41 (R&D) 
M-3SII 
J-I 
M-V 
Epsilon 
Warhead 
reentry 
D D L 
MK12-A, W87/MK21,  
W76-0/MK4, D-5 W88/Mk5 
MIRV capable DF-41, DF-5, 
DF-31A, DF31-B 
OREX 
EXPRESS, 
USERS-SEM 
Hayabusa 
SLBM D D L 
UGM-133 Trident SSBMs, 
Minuteman III W78/Mk12A, 
Minuteman III W87/Mk21 
JL-1, JL-2, Type 092 SSBN, 
SSBN, Type 096 SSBN 
(R&D) 
Epsilon derivative on Sōyrū 
submarine platform: 1-3, 20-250 kt 
range MIRV potential. 
 
D = In use, developed, or under development 
R = Under research 
U = Unknown 
S = Suspended 
L = Latent/ technically feasible 
H/L = Halted, latent, technically feasible 
N = No evidence 
X = Inapplicable 
Source for Chinese capabilities: US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2014 Report to Congress 
of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington D.C., November 2014, 
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/Complete%20Report.PDF, 318-328. 
 
 
